


# Side Channel Attacks

Differential Power Analysis


# Power Consumption

- Power consumption depends on the inputs to a circuit.
- We can reveal information about the circuit by observing the power consumption.

# Data Acquisition




# Data Acquisition




- Insert a small resistor at the ground pin.
- ~ 5 - 10 ohm

# Data Acquisition





- Insert a small resistor at the ground pin.
- ~ 5 - 10 ohm
- Use an oscilloscope to measure the voltage across the resistor

# Power Trace



- We can see the 16 rounds of DES on this trace.
- Notice the variation in voltage between the rounds.

# Power Trace



# Hamming Weight Model

- Count the number of '1s' in a binary number.
- Model each bit as a capacitor.
- A '1' means we charge the capacitor.
- A '0' means we don't charge the capacitor.



# Hamming Weight Model

- Example:
  - $0x67 = 0110\ 0111$
  - $HW(0x67) = 5$

# Hamming Distance Model

- Count the number of bits that differ in two binary numbers.
- Represents an XOR gate.
- A bit that changes uses more power than one that doesn't change.

# Hamming Distance

- Example

- $0x53 = 0101\ 0011$

- $0x78 = 0111\ 1000$

- $XOR(0x53, 0x78) = 0010\ 1011$

- $HD(0x53, 0x78) = 4$

# DPA Example: RSM




Figure 3. Linear part of the RSM datapath.

- Plaintext is masked prior to encryption.

# DPA Example: RSM

- Given:
  - $M = \{0x00, 0x0F, 0x36, 0x39, 0x53, 0x5C, 0x65, 0x6A, 0x95, 0x9A, 0xA3, 0xAC, 0xC6, 0xC9, 0xF0, 0xFF\}$
  - Randomly generated offset shifts masks.
  - Offset updated after encrypting one block.

# DPA Example: RSM

- Need to determine mask offset in order to mount DPA attack.
- Target address bus when reading masks from memory.

# DPA Example: RSM


- Use hamming weight to guess power consumption of the least significant byte of the address.
- $h = HD(\{0x0, 0x1, 0x2, 0x3, 0x4, 0x5, 0x6, 0x7, 0x8, 0x9, 0xA, 0xB, 0xC, 0xD, 0xE, 0xF\})$
- $h = \{0, 1, 1, 2, 1, 2, 2, 3, 1, 2, 2, 3, 2, 3, 3, 4\}$

# DPA Example: RSM

- We expect to see a pattern like one of the following:
  - $h = \{0, 1, 1, 2, 1, 2, 2, 3, 1, 2, 2, 3, 2, 3, 3, 4\}$
  - $h = \{1, 1, 2, 1, 2, 2, 3, 1, 2, 2, 3, 2, 3, 3, 4, 0\}$
  - $h = \{1, 2, 1, 2, 2, 3, 1, 2, 2, 3, 2, 3, 3, 4, 0, 1\}$
  - ...
  - $h = \{4, 0, 1, 1, 2, 1, 2, 2, 3, 1, 2, 2, 3, 2, 3, 3\}$





# DPA Example: RSM



- Select points of interest from power trace.
- Access memory each loop iteration.

# DPA Example: RSM



# DPA Example: RSM

- Use Pearson Correlation Coefficient to find best offset.

Offset	Correlation	Offset	Correlation
0x0	.4634	0x8	.9347
0x1	-.3055	0x9	.0466
0x2	-.0181	0xA	.1942
0x3	-.4194	0xB	-.3935
0x4	.0386	0xC	.3599
0x5	-.246	0xD	-.4065
0x6	.1217	0xE	-.0388
0x7	-.1709	0xF	-.5075

# DPA Example: RSM

- To recover the key:
  - Use hamming distance between key guess and masked plaintext to estimate power consumption.
  - Calculate the correlation coefficient between hypothetical power consumption and the measured power consumption.
- Requires many power traces.

# Questions?

- For more information, see:
  - [www.dpacontest.org](http://www.dpacontest.org)
  - [http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/3-540-48405-1\\_25#page-2](http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/3-540-48405-1_25#page-2)