CSCI 4974 / 6974
Hardware Reverse Engineering

Lecture 12: Non-invasive attacks
Quiz

• Memory technologies
Attack types

- Non-invasive
  - Any attack which does not damage the package
Non-invasive attacks

- Program/debug interfaces
- Power analysis
- Fault injection
Program/debug interfaces

- Several common ones in use
  - JTAG
  - UART (serial port)
  - Vendor proprietary
- May give you anything from a shell on the chip to full code execution and firmware access!
- Usually locked down, but often not too strongly
JTAG

- IEEE 1149.1 Joint Test Action Group
- Standard interface for IC test ports
- Standard only covers layer 2 and some of 3
  - Different connectors and voltage levels in use
  - A few basic registers defined in standard, others are up to the chip designer
- Can chain arbitrarily many devices end to end
JTAG

• Full duplex interface with four pins total
  – One control pin (TMS)
  – Clock (TCK)
  – Shift register data in/out (TDI, TDO)
• Optional reset line (TRST)
• Nonstandard return clock (TRTCK)
JTAG

- Two registers
  - IR = operation to perform
  - DR = data for that operation
- IR size is constant for any given chip
- DR is basically a pointer, target is set by IR
  - DR size varies with IR value
JTAG

- JTAG TAP runs a simple state machine
- TMS controls state
  - Idle: nothing going on
  - Capture: store chip->host data in DR
  - Shift: move data in/out of DR
  - Update: process host->chip data
JTAG Test Access Port (TAP) controller state transition diagram
Standard JTAG instructions

- **BYPASS** (IR = all 1s)
  - DR is a single D flipflop

- **IDCODE** (IR has this value at reset)
  - DR is a 32-bit unique identifier for device type

- **EXTEST/SAMPLE/PRELOAD**
  - IR value is chip-specific, defined in BSDL file
  - Used for boundary-scan board test
Other JTAG instructions

- **USERCODE (not required)**
  - DR is a 32-bit value set by firmware
  - Used to check FW version etc

- **Vendor-specific**
  - Can be any size, any data format
  - May even be undocumented
  - Check BSDL and chip documentation
Serial port (UART)

- Byte-wise 2-wire serial protocol
- Start bit, 8 data bits, stop bit
- Baud rates, connectors, etc vary
- Real RS-232 is +/- 12V levels on DE-9, most modern devices are LVCMOS33 on pin header
- Sometimes used for debug logging
- Many Linux devices have UART shells!
• Read chip vendor datasheets for details
• Often locked down with read-protect bit
• When not disabled (or protection defeated), typically allows
  – dumping of firmware flash/SRAM
  – single-stepping CPU
  – reading/writing CPU registers
  – and more!
Power analysis

- Short-term IC power consumption is a highly complex function depending on clock speed and actual data being processed
- Very difficult to predict exactly w/o process info
- But empirical data can be useful!
Simple power analysis

- Look at graphs of power usage vs time
- Can typically distinguish
  - Sleep vs active instruction execution
  - Different types of CPU instruction (sometimes)
- Often enough for breaking sq+mult RSA
Differential power analysis

- Use more complex statistical analysis
- Ex: cross-correlation between inst. with known inputs
- Look at high-frequency harmonics as signals propagate through combinatorial logic
- Can sometimes figure out actual data values in use
Fault injection

- Cause circuit to malfunction in some way
- May or may not be precisely controllable
- Many different methods
  - Voltage
  - Temperature
  - Clock/timing
  - Radiation
  - Semi-invasive methods (see lecture 14)
Fault injection

- Typically very low cost, minimal resources
- May require detailed circuit knowledge
- Common workflow:
  - Decap device, analyze circuit
  - Execute invasive attack
  - Determine exactly where to glitch
  - Non-invasive attack is more broadly usable
Goals of fault injection

- Erase lock bits but keep FW flash intact
- Get CPU to skip an instruction
- Compute wrong value for cryptanalysis
  - See next lecture
Thermal glitching

- Heat or cool chip beyond operating limits
- Hard to precisely control
  - Max $dT/dt$ is limited by package thermal mass
  - Not used very often in practice for this reason
Voltage glitching

- Drop power supply below minimum
- May corrupt SRAM contents
- Increases RC propagation delays
- Makes NVRAM erase/program unreliable
- Can be precisely targeted
  - One of the most common techniques
Clock/timing glitching

- Send a clock pulse that's too short
  - Latch intermediate value or go metastable
- Can be precisely controlled
  - May be hard to predict exactly when to send glitch due to PTV variation
  - One of the most common techniques
Radiation glitching

- Irradiate device with some kind of energy
  - X-rays
  - Gamma rays
  - Visible/UV/IR light (semi-invasive, needs decap)
  - Neutrons, alpha particles, etc
- Particles induce photocurrents, leakage, etc
- Aim beam to target portion of the die or even single transistors. Wavelength/tech dependent.
Radiation glitching

• Some require minimal resources
  - Camera flash or laser pointer + microscope
  - Place device near piece of high-grade uranium ore and hope for the best!
• Focused beams of esoteric particles require serious equipment (particle accelerator etc)
Data remanence

- Memory contents don't always disappear when “erased”!
SRAM data remanence

- Charge stays on poly gates briefly after power is removed
- If device doesn't clear mem on reset, may be possible to read data after loading new FW etc
DRAM data remanence

- Same phenomenon, increased capacitance means data can last longer
- Older DIMMs could even be pulled and moved to new mobo if chilled
- Modern processes leak more :(
Flash data remanence

- FTL COW means old data may stick around
- Erase cycle moves most charge but not all
  - Voltage glitching may enhance this!
- Partial prog/erase may allow measuring residual charge
Questions?

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